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Seizing the Ethical High Ground: Ethical Reputation Building in Corrupt Environments 
ABSTRACT 
We study how ethical behavior by firms leads to ethical reputation building. Based 
on our in-depth studies of two firms in India and Zimbabwe that resisted corruption and 
survived for extended time periods, we propose that in addition to behaving ethically, 
firms need to elicit favorable responses from a critical mass of stakeholders from both 
strong and weak tie networks in order for their ethical reputations to diffuse quickly and 
widely. We find that the strength of stakeholder responses to ethical behavior is 
moderated by firm level and contextual factors: high status affiliations, industry 
characteristics, the nature of corruption resisted, the presence of a plural press, the 
potential for collective action, and the presence of an independent judiciary. These 
antecedents also influence the pattern of stakeholder resource commitments that firms 
are able to enjoy as a result of having built ethical reputations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have acknowledged that reputation is a valuable organizational resource 
(Miles and Covin, 2000; Fombrun, 2001) and have studied how it is created and how it 
influences the organization’s ability to attract stakeholder commitments. Studies have 
been conducted both in the context of established companies (Fombrun 1996, Fombrun 
and Shanley 1990, Roberts and Dowling 2002, Wartick 2002) and more recently, new 
ventures (Pollock et al. 2004, Rindova et al. 2007, Williamson 2000; Petkova et al., 
2014). Prior research has been consistent in highlighting the positive effects of 
organizational reputation; based on a comprehensive review of forty three studies, 
Lange et al. (2011) report that all but one found that it leads to positive firm outcomes. 
In this paper, we study one specific form of organizational reputation, ethical 
reputation, in environments with widespread corruption. We believe that understanding 
the feasibility of ethical reputation building in corrupt environments is of great societal 
importance, and at the same time of immense practical benefit to founders of young 
firms and managers of established companies. This is particularly true of firms from 
emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Nigeria, where 
weak institutional regimes and growing business opportunities combine to create 
opportunities for corruption (Svensson, 2005). Founders and managers of firms from 
developed economies also face corruption in their internationalization to emerging 
economies (Wei, 2000; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). As globalization gathers steam, more 
and more companies will come across the challenge of dealing effectively with 
corruption (Elliott, 1997). These companies can benefit from research on resistance to 
corruption and how it contributes to ethical reputation building.  
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Studies that take macro-level perspectives on corruption and that explore policy 
initiatives to mitigate it have a long history (Pellegrini, 2011; World Bank 2001). 
However, studies on micro-level approaches to dealing with corruption are relatively 
scarce (see Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins and Eden, 2003; Galang, 2012, and 
Arvis and Berenbeim, 2003, for exceptions). A deeper knowledge of the micro aspects 
of corruption is important because it is not clear from the literature how an entrepreneur 
or manager should respond to a demand from a government official for a bribe. What 
consequences should s/he prepare for if s/he chooses not to give in to the demand? What 
are the costs and benefits of resisting corruption? Might the costs of resisting corruption 
in the short term translate into ethical reputation returns over the medium to long term? 
Our study seeks to address such micro-level questions. 
Of course, dealing effectively with corruption needs to be understood within the 
larger endeavor of survival (in the case of early stage firms) and of achieving sustained 
performance (in the case of established companies). A pre-condition for an 
organization’s survival and long term success is its ability to obtain critical resources 
from stakeholders (Birley 1985, Aldrich and Zimmer 1986, Jarrillo 1989, Starr and 
MacMillan 1990), both internal (employees) and external (customers, suppliers, 
investors, and the community, among others). Organizations can facilitate resource 
acquisition from stakeholders through the building of reputations that signal 
characteristics considered valuable and desirable by them (Benjamin and Podolny 1999, 
Standifird 2001, Saxton and Dollinger 2004, Turban and Cable 2003, Boyd, Berg and 
Ketchen, 2010, Rindova et al. 2005). 
In environments characterized by widespread corruption, some organizations may 
see an opportunity in making an investment to develop an organizational resource 
(ethical reputation) that would be perceived as valuable by stakeholders because, by 
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definition, it is scarce in such contexts (Harrison, Bosse, Philips, 2010). They may thus 
consider taking an ethical stance and signaling their ethical values, as a way of building 
trust with and reducing uncertainty for stakeholders.  
However, the issue of why stakeholders would commit resources to ethical firms in 
corrupt environments is not straightforward from a theoretical perspective. On the one 
hand, one could argue that unethical behaviors (such as bribery) impose financial and 
ethical costs on businesses. Therefore, stakeholders might be drawn to organizations 
that resist corruption to save these costs. On the other hand, resisting such behaviors in 
environments with widespread corruption might impose even higher costs, in the form 
of permissions and licenses delayed or denied, and orders lost. Highly corrupt 
environments also typically have weak law enforcement (Nwabuzor, 2005), which 
increases the salience to stakeholders of the costs of ethical behavior relative to the 
benefits. In contrast to Western contexts, where scholars and practitioners argue that 
perceptions of poor ethical behavior have a negative impact on organizational reputation 
(Alsop, 2004; Sims, 2009), we suggest that ethical behavior in corrupt environments 
may create a higher degree of uncertainty for stakeholders.  
One alternative for firms is to cooperate with other firms in the same industry, 
referred to as ‘Teaming up with the Jones’s’ (Barnett and Hoffman, 2008), but this 
assumes contexts in which organizations are working together to protect the reputation 
and legitimacy of an entire industry, particularly when faced with significant negative 
scrutiny. However, defection in corrupt environments is common, as Kochan and 
Goodyear (2011) point out – “When competing for a contract with a company that has a 
reputation for bribery (or in a country that is synonymous with corruption) a business 
may be more tempted to offer bribes” (p. 14).  Moreover, if ethical reputation is what a 
firm seeks to build in a corrupt environment, it may not have the incentive to cooperate 
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with firms in the same industry as it would need to share the credit for resisting 
corruption with them.  
Thus, while many firms may dislike unethical behaviors, they may see it as a 
necessary evil to do business in corrupt environments, whose negative effects are 
outweighed by the benefits of helping customers gain access to products and services 
that they value, employees with jobs that remunerate them well and give them 
professional satisfaction, suppliers with business opportunities, investors with dividends 
and capital gains, and the broader community with tax proceeds. They may be of the 
view that individual economic agents can do little to tackle widespread corruption, 
which must be tackled at the macro level through appropriate policy interventions and 
through the law and order apparatus of the state. What is more, many entrepreneurs and 
managers in corrupt environments who succumb to the culture of corruption around 
them may actually see themselves as victims of the corrupt system, rather than as its 
perpetrators. 
This raises the question of whether stakeholders themselves are a homogeneous 
group (Neville et al., 2005; Walker, 2010). Just as we posit a variation in ethical 
behaviors among firms, we may also expect a variation among stakeholders in their 
disposition to back ethical ventures in corrupt environments. Clearly, there is a large 
number of stakeholders in corrupt environments who choose to support corrupt 
companies. At the same time, there might be other stakeholders who either see benefits 
in doing business with ethical firms or are willing to incur a penalty to support such 
firms (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer, 1998). In other words, stakeholders vary in 
the factors which they prioritize, and their attitudes towards ethical conduct may not be 
uniform (Reuber and Fischer, 2010). Arguably, the signaling of ethical reputation 
through ethical behavior could be one way for a firm to attract and retain like-minded 
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stakeholders to the organization (Ferris et al., 2007; Bhattacharya et al., 2008; Harvey 
and Morris, 2012). 
In this study, we examine if and how, in environments with widespread corruption, 
resistance to corruption can lead to ethical reputation building, which in turn can 
contribute to mutually beneficial economic transactions with stakeholders and to the 
creation of economic value for all parties. Its contribution to the literature in 
management and to managerial practice is that, as far as we know, it is the first 
empirical study that explicitly explores the costs and benefits for private firms of ethical 
reputation building in corrupt environments.  
CORPORATE AND ETHICAL REPUTATION 
Lange et al. (2011), in their comprehensive review of organizational reputation, 
categorize conceptualizations of organizational reputation in the extant literature into 
three dimensions that they argue are theoretically orthogonal to each other: being 
known, being known for something, and generalized favorability.  
Being known refers to the prominence or salience of an organization, which could 
be the result of positive, neutral or negative factors. Stemming from an institutional 
perspective, it is understood as a cognitive phenomenon, with stakeholders being aware 
of or familiar with the existence of an organization without necessarily demonstrating 
any affect towards it, and applies to the organization overall rather than to any of its 
particular characteristics (Rindova et al., 2005). Ten out of forty-three studies reviewed 
by Lange et al. (2011) incorporated this conceptualization, either as the sole dimension 
or along with one or both of the others. Being known for something refers to awareness 
of a particular characteristic of an organization that is of interest to the concerned 
stakeholder group. Also referred to as quality or perceived quality, it involves an 
evaluative element on the part of stakeholders that some favorable output can be 
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expected by them as a result of the organization possessing that particular characteristic 
(for example, safety in the case of Volvo automobiles). Twenty four out of forty three 
studies reviewed by Lange et al. (2011) conceptualized organizational reputation in a 
way that was wholly or partially consistent with this view. Finally, generalized 
favorability (nineteen out of forty three studies) refers to an overall favorable 
assessment based on multiple aggregated attributes and is socially constructed by large 
numbers of stakeholders, belonging to multiple stakeholder groups, and is comparative 
in nature with other similar organizations. Lange et al. (2011) argue that an 
organization’s reputation can be mapped by situating it within the boundaries of these 
three dimensions.  
The definition of Fombrun (1996) forms the basis for subsequent work that builds 
on this third conceptualization of organizational reputation: “a perceptual representation 
of a company’s past actions and future prospects that describes the firm’s overall appeal 
to its key constituents when compared to other leading rivals” (p.72). Barnett et al. 
(2006: 32) argue that stakeholders will vary in their level of engagement with 
reputation, which they refer to as: a state of awareness, an assessment and an asset. 
Awareness exists when stakeholders have some knowledge of an organization, but are 
not in a position to make a judgment about its activities. Assessment exists when 
stakeholders have greater knowledge of an organization’s activities and will make 
judgments about it. Reputation becomes an asset when stakeholders have knowledge of 
an organization’s activities that hold a particular value for them, for example as 
customers or shareholders. 
Notwithstanding the proliferation of research on reputation, there has been a dearth 
of studies exploring how ethical reputation is built through ethical conduct in corrupt 
environments. We have limited understanding of the costs and benefits of ethical 
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behavior, and how these may vary given the nature of corruption resisted. Political 
scientists have long distinguished between political (or grand) and bureaucratic (or 
petty) corruption. Amundsen (1999) provides an account of the differences, which we 
seek to explore in this study: 
“Political or grand corruption takes place at the high levels of the political 
system. It is when the politicians and state agents, who are entitled to make and 
enforce the laws in the name of the people, are themselves corrupt. Political 
corruption is when political decision-makers use the political power they are 
armed with, to sustain their power, status and wealth. Thus, political corruption 
can be distinguished from bureaucratic or petty corruption, which is corruption 
in the public administration, at the implementation end of politics” (p.3). 
These two forms of corruption have also been referred to as formal and informal 
corruption (Keig, Brouthers and Marshall, 2015). 
We situate our current study of ethical reputation building within the being known 
for something conceptualization of organizational reputation, and explore two specific 
questions, which focus, respectively, on the antecedents and consequences of 
reputation:  
i) What factors influence the speed and extent of the diffusion of ethical 
reputations in corrupt environments?  
ii) What impact does ethical reputation have on the willingness of stakeholders to 
support firms in corrupt environments?  
METHODS 
The study of corruption is challenging from an empirical perspective, as has been noted 
by Banerjee, Mullainathan and Hanna (2013: 1109): 
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“Corruption, by its very nature, is illicit and secretive. How does one study 
something that is defined in part by the fact that individuals go to great lengths 
to hide it? How does one deal with the fact that attempts to measure corruption 
may cause the actors involved to either reduce their illicit behaviors during the 
periods of measurement or find new ways to obscure their behavior? If we 
cannot accurately measure corruption, how can we test among different 
theories, measure its impacts, or even produce suggestive correlations?” 
In order to understand the phenomenon in-depth, we identified companies that had 
been independently certified by media outlets and other credible external sources as 
having resisted corruption in corrupt environments, and had been successful over 
extended time periods – 24 years since inception in the case of one firm and 8 years 
since inception in the case of the other, as of 2002 when we conducted our fieldwork. 
Therefore, by virtue of having survived such long periods these companies had by 
definition been successful in mobilizing stakeholder support. We attempted to 
understand why their stakeholders had transferred resources to these two firms and to 
what extent these resource transfers had been motivated by the firms’ reputation for 
resistance to corruption. 
The method chosen for this research was in-depth case studies (Yin 1989, Stake 
1995). We chose in-depth case studies of unusual firms to understand the phenomenon - 
resistance to corruption in corrupt environments. The two cases we report in this paper 
are unusual (Siggelkow, 2007) in that they involve private enterprises in India and 
Zimbabwe that chose to resist corruption since the time they were founded. The 
selection of the Econet and Alacrity cases, more details of which are provided below, 
followed a purposeful sampling strategy, in which cases are chosen because they are 
information rich in the phenomenon of interest (Patton 1990, p.169). Specifically, the 
cases met the criterion sampling requirement, in that they were firms that: 1) had 
survived over extended periods of time; 2) were operating in corrupt environments; and 
3) had acquired positive reputations from third parties for having resisted corruption (as 
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was certified by a number of independent media sources). We chose examples from 
these two countries because they are both perceived to be highly corrupt, reflected in the 
fact that they were both ranked 71st out of 102 countries in Transparency International’s 
2002 Corruption Perception Index based on an identical low score of 2.7 out of 10. 
Therefore, exemplars of private companies resisting corruption from their inception and 
surviving for such long periods are rare and difficult to access in these two countries. 
Our cases are unusual and revelatory, much akin to the “talking pigs” that Siggelkow 
(2007) wrote about. We make this claim because in addition to the fact that such 
organizations are rare to come across, we were able to acquire high quality data through 
unconstrained access to them and were able to triangulate their claims of ethical 
behavior through multiple sources, both internal and external. 
We had four main sources of information. First, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with the founders of both companies, and with managers, former managers, 
employees, customers, suppliers, members of the press, and other informed external 
sources. In total, 82 interviews were conducted for the two cases, averaging 
approximately one hour each, although the longest interview lasted more than eight 
hours in multiple sittings. Eighty percent of these interviews (66 out of 82) were 
recorded and transcribed (see Table 1 for an overview of our subject companies and 
Table 2 for the interviewee list). The interview transcripts and notes totaled 
approximately 2,000 pages. Second, we had access to company documents such as 
annual reports, internal circulars, and market reports. Third, there was a large amount of 
data from press reports. Fourth, we studied contextual data from multilateral 
organizations such as the World Bank and affiliates and other organizations such as 
Transparency International.   
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Once the data from the transcripts, press reports, and other archival sources were 
analyzed, several interviewees were approached by telephone and e-mail for further 
clarifications. This diversity of sources of information allowed us to achieve 
methodological triangulation (Stake 1995, p.114) and also informed our coding 
procedure. We then followed a member checking process (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), 
wherein the case study drafts were submitted to the companies for feedback on 
chronological accuracy, inferential accuracy, and comprehensiveness in covering the 
most important events and themes. The member checking process was also carried out 
in compliance with our university’s Institutional Review Board guidelines on human 
subjects research. The data analysis, reduction (i.e., condensing the vast amount of 
primary and secondary data into two research case studies), and member checking 
procedures took a total of five months for both cases. The final research case studies 
were of 86 double spaced pages for Alacrity and 66 double spaced pages for Econet. We 
also developed timelines for the two cases.   
For our data analysis, the transcript data were broken up into major themes with 
the research questions as guide. In particular, we were looking for factors that 
influenced the building of ethical reputations, i.e., being known for something (research 
question i) and the impact of acquiring an ethical reputation among stakeholders 
(research question ii). We generated 82 data chunks from the interview transcripts, 
which provided details about who, when and why had committed resources to the 
ventures. Each data chunk was coded along five categories, as explained in Table 3. In 
total, 410 codes were given, five each for the 82 data chunks derived from the interview 
transcripts. One of the co-authors (first coder), who had collected the data, coded the 
chunks along the five dimensions. A second coder, who had no prior exposure to this 
research, was requested to code the 82 chunks independently with the coding categories 
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as guide. We then analyzed the degree to which the second coder’s codes were in 
agreement with those of the first coder. We found 94.02% agreement between the two 
sets of codes. One reason for the high inter-coder validity was that the five dimensions 
of the coding were quite factual, and most interviews explicitly elicited this information 
from the interviewees, leaving little need for the coders to exercise their judgment. We 
followed a conservative approach and dropped the nearly 6% of codes on which there 
was no agreement between the first and second coder. We report our results in the 
Findings section. 
….. 
TABLES 1, 2 and 3 about here 
….. 
Reputation and stakeholder support 
We operationalized ethical behavior as resistance to corruption, and more 
specifically, resistance to bribery. In order to measure reputation, we follow Barnett, 
Jermier and Lafferty (2006) in defining organizational reputation as the judgments and 
assessments of stakeholders about a focal firm (see also Money and Hillenbrand, 2006). 
When stakeholders perceive an organization to be ethical, then the organization can be 
said to have acquired an ethical reputation. The greater the number of stakeholders that 
view the organization as ethical, the stronger its claims around holding an ethical 
reputation. In our view, there are two critical tests of the strength of an organization’s 
reputation: first, whether stakeholders beyond the strong tie family and friends network 
of the organization’s founders are willing to support the firm with their resources, and 
second, whether stakeholders place an economic value on the reputation, in other words, 
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whether they are willing to pay a premium or incur a penalty to transact business with 
the organization.  
Entrepreneurs typically obtain resources in the initial stages from family and 
close friends (Hite and Hesterly, 2001). As the circle of stakeholders committing 
resources to the firm widens, the firm is able to grow and diminish its liability of 
newness and smallness (Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983; Singh, Tucker and House, 
1986; Bruderl and Schussler, 1990). Consistent with the above discussion, we 
conceptualize the strength of a firm’s ethical reputation to be a function of the extent of 
stakeholder relationships (beyond family and friends) it is able to build in a given 
amount of time and the willingness of the stakeholders to support the ethical firm at a 
cost to themselves. 
Subject companies 
Econet 
Econet was founded by Strive Masiyiwa in Zimbabwe, and its history can be traced to 
1993, when he first approached the Zimbabwean Post and Telecommunications 
Corporation (PTC) for a mobile telecommunications license. After his request was 
rejected, Masiyiwa fought a five year legal battle, first against the PTC and then against 
the Zimbabwean government, for a license that was issued to his company only in July 
1998, five years after his first request and nearly two years after PTC launched its own 
mobile service and cornered the corporate market. In spite of this two year 
disadvantage, it took Econet only a few months to achieve market leadership, and to 
achieve the remarkable feat for a telecommunications company of turning a profit in its 
first year of operations (this was in part because it did not have to pay any license fees).  
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There were a number of occasions during Masiyiwa’s five year battle in which he 
could have obtained the license if only he had “accommodated” a few individuals in 
positions of power, but he steadfastly refused to do so and preferred to get the license 
the proper way. One press article i reported that a middleman for three government 
ministers had stated outright to Masiyiwa - “The price for a license is $400,000 US.” He 
then reportedly consulted with the ministers, who were in an adjoining room, and 
returned to say - “OK. You can pay in installments.” 
Masiyiwa’s story was covered extensively in the Zimbabwean and international 
media, including The Economist, Newsweek, Christian Science Monitor, The 
Vancouver Sun, and others. In 2002, he was selected by CNN/Time as one of the most 
globally influential leaders.  
Alacrity 
Alacrity was set up by Amol Karnad in 1978 as a consultancy firm. It entered the 
business of constructing residential apartments in 1981 in the southern Indian city of 
Chennai. Over a 20 year period, Alacrity established a reputation for ethical behavior in 
the construction industry, which is notorious for its high incidence of corruption that 
results from the very high degree of governmental intervention. 
In the 1981-2002 period, companies in the construction business in Chennai had to 
deal with many governmental departments for each project: the Revenue Authority for 
the registration of documents; the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority 
(CMDA), which formulates and implements building regulations; the Chennai 
Corporation, which issues the building permits; the Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply 
and Sewerage Board (CMWSSB), which provides water and sewerage connections; the 
Tamilnadu Electricity Board (TNEB), which provides the electricity connection; and the 
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Income Tax Department, which intervenes to ensure that land and construction prices 
are not being falsified to evade taxes.  
There were several instances in which Alacrity’s management refused to bribe 
public officials even though this refusal imposed huge costs on the company. In one 
instance that was reported in a national business publication, the company’s refusal to 
pay a bribe of US$ 10 to an official in the state’s electricity department led to an eight 
month delay in the completion of the project, for which it had to pay customers a 
penalty of more than US$ 26,000ii.  
Alacrity quickly achieved market leadership, with an estimated 25% market share 
of the Chennai residential construction market, as was confirmed in 1991 by the 
Chairman of the Alsa Group, a Chennai based construction company, who remarked, 
“Alacrity is undoubtedly the market leader in the residential flats segment with a 
reputation for being fine buildersiii.” 
….. 
TABLES 4 and 5 about here 
….. 
FINDINGS 
Speed and extent of ethical reputation 
The first finding we report is that Econet established an ethical reputation more quickly 
than Alacrity. Econet’s reputation as an ethical organization was established soon after 
it began its five year battle for a telecoms license, and long before it started operating its 
business in 1998. Of the interview chunks that referred to resource commitments to 
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Econet, 66.67% were at the pre-operational stage, before Econet was granted a license 
to operate the network (see last column of Table 4). The media coverage received by 
Econet was much greater and wider: we found 83 reports in the domestic Zimbabwean 
media between 1993 and 2002, and 69 reports in the international media during the 
same period, including Newsweek, The Economist, Wall Street Journal Europe, the 
Vancouver Sun and the Christian Science Monitor. In total, 29 different media outlets, 
national and international, covered the story. In comparison, only 32.26% of the 
resource commitment chunks in the case of Alacrity were at the pre-operational stage 
(see last column of Table 5). We could find less than 10 media reports on Alacrity, all in 
the domestic media, between 1978 and 2002. This more frequent and much wider media 
coverage brought news of Econet and its ethical actions more quickly to potential 
stakeholders, which had implications on the speed of diffusion of its ethical reputation 
(being known for something). 
The second finding we report is that Econet received resource commitments from a 
much wider cross section of stakeholders, including friends, bankers, a section of the 
press, Church groups, some members of government, governmental employees, the 
company’s own employees, civil rights organizations, the public, and a law firm (see 
second column of Table 4). Nine different stakeholder groups committed resources to 
Econet, versus six for Alacrity (see second column of Table 5), over the course of their 
existence. Petkova et al (2008) refer to this as “generalized”, as opposed to “localized”, 
reputation. Of the total number of chunks that referred to Econet’s resource 
commitments, 74.51% referred to commitments made by “weak ties”, i.e., stakeholders 
who were beyond the second order in terms of network distance from Masiyiwa (see 
third column of Table 4). 
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Several employees, creditors and the law firm that supported Masiyiwa believed so 
strongly in his ethical stance that they went for several months without being paid. Two 
noteworthy features of Econet’s resource acquisition pattern are that it received 
considerable unsolicited support from individuals and organizations who were neither 
personally known to Masiyiwa nor to his first order network members at the time the 
support was given and that it received much of this support before it was clear that it 
could satisfy the quid pro quo that the support entailed (in the form of provision of 
telecoms services). Much of this support was given for non-pecuniary reasons. For 
example, the founder of a financial services company who supported Econet from the 
beginning was asked why he did so and replied: “The Lord spoke to me that I had to 
help him.” Masiyiwa also mentioned this individual and the importance of their shared 
Christian faith and its influence on “how to run a business properly” (column 5 of 
Tables 4 and 5 shows a much higher incidence of Econet receiving resources from 
moderate and weak ties due to “Shared Values” perceived by stakeholders). 
In contrast, Alacrity’s resource acquisition patterns were consistent with what is 
described in the entrepreneurship literature for seed and early-stage firms. It initially 
received support from strong ties - family members and friends of the founder Amol 
Karnad (see column 3 of Table 5). Of the total number of interview chunks referring to 
Alacrity’s resource commitments, only 29.03% referred to commitments from weak 
ties, i.e., stakeholders beyond Amol’s second order network. The first twenty four 
apartments the company constructed were all sold to strong ties, including family 
members, friends and friends’ family members. These apartments were priced 
approximately 40% below the market price, which raised the suspicion in the Income 
Tax Department that Alacrity and the apartment owners were reporting a much lower 
price than the market price in order to evade taxes. Instrumental reasons (coded as quid 
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pro quo in Table 5) played a much greater role in the resource transfers to Alacrity, even 
in those instances where the stakeholders perceived value congruence between 
themselves and the firm.  
Factors impacting speed and extent of ethical reputation building 
Stakeholder response 
From our data, it is clear that stakeholder responses to ethical behavior – both in 
terms of which stakeholders respond and why they do so – are key determinants of the 
speed and extent of ethical reputation building. We conceptualize stakeholder responses 
as playing a mediating role between the firm’s ethical behaviors on the one hand and the 
speed and extent of its reputation building on the other. The wider the circle of 
stakeholders (i.e. weak ties), beyond the immediate network of the founding team, who 
are drawn to the focal firm, and the greater the diversity in their motivations for 
transferring resources to it, beyond just a quid pro quo, the easier it is for the firm to 
survive and grow.  
Our analysis of the data points to six broad factors which act as moderators for 
how stakeholders respond to ethical behavior (high status affiliations; industry 
characteristics; nature of corruption resisted; polarized media and society; the potential 
for collective action; and the presence of independent judiciary), which in turn impacts 
the speed and extent of ethical reputation building (see Figure 1). 
High-status affiliations 
Masiyiwa was a nationally prominent figure before he set up Econet, having founded an 
electrical engineering company called Retrofit in 1987. Retrofit received contracts from 
the Zimbabwe armed forces and had even done work at President Robert Mugabe’s 
home. He was named Businessman of the Year by the Chamber of Commerce in 1990. 
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He was also the first Secretary General of the Indigenous Business Development 
Council (IBDC). In contrast, Amol Karnad was a 28 year old first time entrepreneur in 
1978 when he set up Alacrity Consultants, which changed its business and name to 
Alacrity Housing in 1981. He was not known beyond his circle of family and friends.  
Firms seek affiliations with high-status individuals or organizations as a way of 
acquiring legitimacy and building reputation among a broad group of stakeholders 
(Hayward et al., 2004; Pfarrer et al., 2010), especially when they are at the start-up stage 
(Benjamin and Podolny 1999; Rindova et al., 2006, 2007). This is also consistent with 
Petkova’s (2012) notion of ‘reputation by endowment’, when the individual reputation 
of a founder is used by stakeholders as an underlying indicator of the quality and 
potential of the organization, which in turn helps it to gain prominence. 
Industry characteristics 
Econet was trying to enter a sunrise industry in 1993, mobile telecommunications, that 
had captured the imagination of consumers, investors and the media all over the world. 
In 1993, the Post and Telegraph Corporation of Zimbabwe (PTC) was the monopoly 
provider of fixed-line telephone services. The quality of the service provided was also 
poor; it took five attempts on average to complete a call. This combination of an 
exciting new technology, a universal need and a very low-quality incumbent service 
provider played in Econet’s favor and garnered it the attention of all the key 
stakeholders (e.g. investors, partners, employees and customers). In contrast, Alacrity 
was operating in the construction industry, which was mature, fragmented and local (in 
the 1980s and 1990s competition in the construction business in India was city-based). 
Because of the fragmented nature of the industry, knowledge of Alacrity tended to be 
passed through the strong tie networks of Karnad, who did not receive the same degree 
of prominent media coverage as Masiyiwa. This also restricted the awareness of the 
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business proposition to a narrow group of stakeholders (e.g. strong ties such as family 
and friends) in comparison to the case of Econet, which was attractive to a broad group 
of stakeholders (e.g. strong and weak ties such as family members, friends, community 
members, investors, partners, employees and customers). 
Shamsie (2003) proposed specific industry characteristics as antecedents of 
organizational reputation, and we observe this relationship manifesting itself in these 
two cases. He also found that industries where the products/services have relatively 
lower prices and are purchased more frequently make it easier for firms to create and 
exploit reputations. The intuition here is that organizational reputation allows customers 
to overcome the problem of information asymmetry by avoiding information search 
costs. The lower the transaction value, the lower the stakes for customers and the more 
it pays for them to rely on the reputation of the organization providing the product or 
service as a substitute for incurring search costs to learn about the organization. We find 
that industry characteristics matter in other ways too. Sunrise industries, those that cater 
to a universal need and monopoly industries with a large base of dissatisfied and 
potential customers, are those in which the actions of firms become more salient to 
stakeholders. 
Nature of corruption resisted 
In 1993, Masiyiwa first proposed to the PTC that it operate a mobile telecoms network 
in a joint venture with his company, to which the latter responded that there was no 
demand for mobile telephony in Zimbabwe. Masiyiwa then proposed that he would 
operate a network under license from the PTC, and was again turned down. He then 
challenged PTC’s monopoly in the High Court, arguing that it could license a private 
company under the Radio Communications Act. The High Court ruled in his favor, but 
the PTC appealed the decision in the Supreme Court and got it overturned. Masiyiwa 
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then decided to challenge the monopoly on constitutional grounds, arguing that the poor 
service provided by the PTC impinged on the constitutional right of Zimbabweans as it 
violated Section 20, which stated that “every Zimbabwean has a right to receive and 
impart information without hindrance”. Before he filed the constitutional appeal, he was 
warned by his lawyers against doing so, as it would be seen as a challenge to President 
Mugabe himself and the consequences would be dire. He nevertheless proceeded with 
the constitutional challenge. As he had been warned, the government retaliated with 
force – his governmental contracts were cancelled, he was not paid the monies he was 
due for the work his company had carried out, his telephones were tapped, his family 
and friends received physical threats and even death threats and he was arrested and 
questioned by the police.  
At different points during his five year battle, he was assured a license if he 
“accommodated” certain interests and limited his own shareholding in the telecoms 
company to 25%. He refused to entertain these proposals (this was reported in 
international media such as Newsweekiv). Both his challenges and the government’s 
retaliation were widely covered in the media, which at that time was polarized between 
pro and anti-governments groups. Thus, the battle that Masiyiwa started to fight against 
the PTC quickly turned into one against the Zimbabwean government, personified in its 
powerful President, Robert Mugabe. The Zimbabwean public saw the battle as one 
between David and Goliath. As the CEO of Econet Zimbabwe (the successor of 
Masiyiwa) pointed out, 
“You know, the four years of legal process, the legal battle if I may call it that 
way, created a lot of goodwill, incredible. Hardly a week would pass by 
without an article being flashed in the newspapers concerning Econet fighting 
the Government over the licence, to the extent that even people in the rural 
areas knew who Strive was. He became a household name.” 
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In contrast, Alacrity’s resistance to corruption was directed mainly at low level 
administrative officers, many of whom worked in state or municipal governmental 
departments, such as the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority and the Tamil 
Nadu Electricity Board. Furthermore, Alacrity dealt with seven different governmental 
agencies for every construction project, which meant that the key stakeholders were less 
clearly defined. It also meant that there were a greater volume of bribery requests, but 
the amounts that were demanded and paid as bribes to governmental officers by 
construction companies were usually quite small. For example, Alacrity was once asked 
for a bribe of INR 150 (roughly US$ 10 at the prevailing exchange rate) by the 
electricity department in return for being given power supply to a new block of 
apartmentsv. 
Following Amundsen (1999), we find that the distinction between political and 
bureaucratic corruption is important for our understanding of how ethical reputations 
are built. Due to its high profile, political corruption, when resisted, attracts much 
greater attention than bureaucratic corruption. At the same time, resisting political 
corruption, especially that of authoritarian regimes, can be dangerous and even life-
threatening for the individuals involved.  Hence, we would suggest that both the costs 
and benefits of resisting political corruption are likely to be higher than those of 
bureaucratic corruption. 
Polarized media and society 
An observer team from the Commonwealth Press Union (CPU) that visited Zimbabwe 
to observe the 2002 presidential election had the following to say about the country’s 
media: 
“We are talking about a country whose newspapers, across the whole spectrum 
of political affiliations and loyalties, unhesitatingly refer to people’s alleged 
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and unproven criminal practices, to people’s health and mental ability, even to 
people’s looks or expected natural death. We are talking about a country where 
the media are devoid of any definable policy standards for screening 
inflammatory political advertorials during a delicate election period. We are 
talking about a country where the media, in their misguided enthusiasm to 
trumpet the political ideals of their adopted election torch-bearers, have 
elevated news reporting to blatant editorializing, thereby breaching the cardinal 
journalistic principle of separating news from comment. We are also talking 
about a country where a vibrant and inspiring civil society admits that political 
and societal polarization is such that neutrality appears to be an unaffordable 
luxury” (Ahnee et al. 2002, p.3). 
The CPU report identified The Herald, The Chronicle and The Sunday Mail to be 
pro-Zanu-PF (the ruling party of Robert Mugabe), The Zimbabwe Mirror to be pro-
Zanu-PF with nuance, and the The Daily News, The Zimbabwe Independent, The 
Financial Gazette and The Standard to be pro-MDC (the opposition party). The 
polarization of the domestic media and of Zimbabwean society played a key role in the 
speedy diffusion of Econet’s actions. Econet became a focal rallying point, akin to a 
Schelling point (Schelling 1960, p.57), around which opposition to Mugabe coalesced. 
The vehicle that carried information of Econet’s actions and behaviors and presented the 
merits of its case to stakeholders was the media, especially the section that was opposed 
to Mugabe’s party. 
Alacrity’s relationship with the media was very different. Fourteen years after it 
was founded, Alacrity made an initial public offering (IPO) of shares on the Indian 
stock market. The IPO prospectus contained information about the company’s 
accumulated losses of INR 31.9 million since 1982. In an attempt to be inclusive, 
Alacrity took out paid full-page advertisements in the national media appreciating the 
support it had received from governmental officials, land owners and apartment buyers 
in its quest to be a values-driven organization. However, the financial media’s response 
was consistently negative. 
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“(The) promoter of Alacrity Housing Limited says that he set up the business 
to fulfill some of his social responsibilities. Or is (he) trying to hide his 
business failure on the pretensions of social servicevi?”  
“But, the company’s accumulated loss stands at Rs. 31.9 million against a 
capital of Rs. 3.3 million in March 1992... Yet, the value-based management 
could not prevent the company from going deep into the red. …. Another 
AHL’s issue slogan reads: “You share our values. Come, share our growth.” 
But, the track record of the promoter-company reveals that there is no value or 
growth left to sharevii.”  
“... Welcome to Scam Two. Welcome to the just-manufactured industrialists 
selling us a too-good-to-be-true storyviii.”  
“A disappointing past performance has not deterred the company from 
presenting a rosy picture in the projections… should you apply for the issue? If 
you believe in miracles, go right aheadix.”   
In-groups and the potential for collective action 
Masiyiwa framed his resistance to corruption as arising out of his Christian faith (Born 
Again Christian). It is estimated that 40% of Zimbabwe’s 11.5 million citizens profess 
the Christian faith. His ethical stance resonated with this very large section of 
Zimbabwe’s population. One interviewee, who had been with Econet from the 
beginning, said: 
“You know, when you have such a prayer meeting, and Mr. Masiyiwa being a 
Christian, he has a lot of other contact people, I mean in the Christian circles, 
they may be pastors, they may be brothers in Christ, they just come and share. 
If somebody feels that he has a word for Econet, they’ll just come and share, 
especially in those early days, one would just have a word, a word of 
encouragement you know, because it wasn’t easy. … So, those people who 
were there sometimes needed encouragement, you know. So Christian brothers 
would come, share a word of encouragement here and there.” 
In contrast, Amol Karnad, the founder of Alacrity, was a staunch atheist and did 
not frame his resistance to corruption in ways that would appeal to large sections of the 
population of Chennai.  
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The relationship between religion and trust has long been discussed by scholars, 
and signaling theory has been applied to religious behavior (see Sosis 2005, for a recent 
discussion of this topic). Sosis (2005) submits that:  
“These groups gainfully facilitate collective action by offering a circumscribed 
social arena in which reputations can be built, evaluated, rewarded, and 
efficiently punished. While face to face reciprocal relations obviate the need 
for trusting behavior within closed religious communities, when social groups 
are fluid religious practices and symbolic markers are successful at promoting 
trust among in-group members and anonymous coreligionists who reside in 
different communities” (p.1).  
Sosis (2005) argues that rather than trust, it is the institutional framework of religion 
that encourages adherents to behave in ways that are expected of them in order to build, 
protect and enhance their reputations. This reputation with members of an “in-group” 
can evolve into collective action (Olson 1965), which means that the support of a wider 
community can be harnessed. 
Presence of independent judiciary 
The battle between Econet and the Zimbabwean government was fought in the 
courts of law. One of the most important contributory factors in the successful 
resistance to corruption of Econet was the existence of an independent judiciary in 
Zimbabwe. According to Saller (2004):  
“Zimbabwe has a recognized tradition of judicial independence and concern 
for human rights that spans not only the years since independence but dates 
back to colonial times. In particular, both before and after independence 
judicial interpretation of draconian legislation and orders for arrested and 
detained persons to be produced in court have provided some measure of 
judicial control over government abuses of human rights” (p. 1-2).  
A senior manager of Econet, of Kenyan nationality, had the following to say about 
Econet’s experience with the courts: 
“Now, having come from Kenya, the first thing that really shocked me was that 
Strive was able to go to court and sustain a legal campaign to get his licence, 
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and not get jailed, not get bumped off or something like that. That to me was - 
we're not even looking at what he had created, that in turn told me something 
about Zimbabwe... And I think what has happened now has happened, but at 
that time there was respect for the rule of law, because he got his license 
through the court, and the Government listened to that, unlike what they're 
doing now, and he got his license and ran his company.” 
Both the High Court and the Supreme Court repeatedly ruled against the 
government (and in favor of Econet). While the independence of the judiciary did not 
directly contribute to Econet’s reputation, it did so indirectly by allowing it to sustain its 
battle and keep it in the public spotlight for five years. 
India also had an independent judiciary during the 1981-2002 period. However, 
given the administrative (petty) and local nature of corruption resisted by Alacrity, there 
were fewer opportunities for the company to escalate its resistance in the courts to 
garner public support. This was because each individual bribe amount was too small 
and Alacrity’s adversaries (the governmental officials who demanded bribes) were too 
diffused in multiple governmental organizations.     
To summarize, the six factors discussed above – high status affiliations, industry 
characteristics, the nature of corruption resisted, the polarized media and society, in-
groups and collective action, and the judicial system as the locus of resistance to 
corruption – made Econet more salient to a potentially wider pool of stakeholders and 
influenced how they responded to its ethical behavior. This salience allowed Econet to 
build its ethical reputation (being known for something) much more quickly and with a 
broader and more influential group of stakeholders than Alacrity. These factors also 
acted as important moderators that explain how stakeholders made different decisions 
around resource commitments in the two cases. 
Although Econet’s success was remarkable, there were some unique contextual 
factors that came together to help it succeed. These structural factors changed 
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significantly such that in 2000, barely two years after Econet received the license, 
Masiyiwa had to leave the country when he was warned that his life was under threat. 
As of February 2016, he had not returned even once. Saller (2004) also notes that since 
2000, the independence of the judiciary has been steadily eroded as the Zimbabwean 
state has become increasingly repressive. As of 2003, only one newspaper that was pro-
opposition (Daily News) was still operatingx. If an organization like Econet were to 
have initiated another battle against the Mugabe regime even two years after the first 
one concluded (in 1998), it would have had no hope of prevailing, notwithstanding the 
support from the Christian community. This serves to show the foundational importance 
of an independent judiciary and an independent media to enable organizations to build 
ethical reputations in corrupt environments. 
The above drivers of ethical reputation had important consequences for how 
stakeholders responded to the ethical endeavors of both firms and consequently for the 
speed and extent of their ethical reputation building. It is clear that Alacrity was also 
remarkably successful over a much longer period (21 years compared to 8 years for 
Econet in 2002, when we conducted our fieldwork) in resisting corruption. It also 
succeeded in building a strong reputation among stakeholders as an ethical builder of 
homes in the city of Chennai. This suggests that resisting bureaucratic corruption may 
be less contingent on contextual factors than resisting political corruption. 
DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Even with two rich case studies of successful resistance to corruption, we cannot 
claim that our findings are generalizable to all contexts. However, our ability to engage 
in depth with two extreme cases suggests patterns that provide important theoretical and 
empirical insights into building ethical reputation (being known for something) in 
corrupt environments, which warrant further investigation. As Siggelkow (2007) avers – 
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“The theory should stand on its own feet. One needs to convince the reader that the 
conceptual argument is plausible and use the case as additional (but not sole) 
justification for one’s argument” (p. 23). 
First, and at a very basic level, our study provides extensive evidence that 
corruption – both political and administrative – can be resisted over long periods in 
environments with widespread corruption. Based partly on our study and partly on 
theoretical reasoning (Siggelkow, 2007), we also surmise that ethical behavior should 
be much more salient to stakeholders in environments where such behavior is scarce, 
such as in India and Zimbabwe. In contrast, in countries with highly ethical business 
cultures such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, normal ethical behaviors (such as 
refusing to bribe) would simply not be salient; firms would need to expand the frontiers 
of ethical behavior to stand out. This means that practicing ethical behaviors in a corrupt 
environment presents an opportunity to build ethical reputation, notwithstanding the 
significant risks to individuals and organizations. Rode, Hogarth and Le Menestrel 
(2008) demonstrated, in an experimental setting, that there is a demand function for 
ethics. Our study confirms their findings in two real-life contexts, and provides the 
added insight that, consistent with economic theory, the willingness of organizations 
and their stakeholders to pay for ethical behavior would be greater in contexts where it 
is scarce. 
Second, in environments with widespread corruption, there exist a sufficient 
number of disaffected stakeholders (cutting across traditional stakeholder groupings) 
who respond positively to a demonstration of ethical leadership by an organization. 
Their passivity in voicing their displeasure at corrupt practices does not imply that they 
will not rally around an organization that takes the lead in making a commitment to 
ethical values. Indeed, a key insight from our study is that the universe of potential 
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stakeholders is heterogeneous in its sensitivity to ethical behaviors, arising from 
stakeholder specific and contextual characteristics. Therefore, not all stakeholders are 
equal in their influence on reputation building (Harvey and Morris, 2012) and the 
importance they will place on particular qualities (Lange et al., 2011; Barnett and 
Pollock, 2012). While extant literature makes a valuable contribution to the 
heterogeneous impact on and importance placed by stakeholders on reputation building, 
we disaggregate further how stakeholders differ in their responses to ethical behavior in 
corrupt environments. We also provide rich and unique empirical evidence of how this 
variation in stakeholder response is underpinned by different moderating factors at both 
the firm and societal level.  
We outline below different stakeholder responses to ethical behavior based on four 
types of stakeholders: indifferent, pragmatic, absent and ethical. These categories are 
conceptually important because they cut across traditional stakeholder boundaries (e.g. 
employees, customers, investors, etc.). We derive them both from the literature and 
from our data. There is one set of stakeholders that places minimal importance on the 
ethical behaviors of firms, which we refer to as indifferent stakeholders. These actors 
are only concerned about the focal firm satisfying their expectations, and not about the 
means employed by the firm to satisfy them. As is apparent from the large volume of 
evidence of firms who do not make a commitment to ethical behavior in corrupt 
environments and still receive support from stakeholders, indifferent actors abound in 
corrupt environments and provide sustenance to corrupt firms. There is a second set, 
derived from our data, that we term pragmatic stakeholders, which would support 
ethical firms as long as the benefit to them from doing so is higher than the cost. For 
example, most of Alacrity’s customers were middle-class salaried professionals. Not 
only were their apartments cheaper, but the uncertainty they faced was lower due to the 
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transaction being completely above board. However, when Alacrity refused to give the 
electricity department official a bribe of US$10, they could not move into their new 
apartments for eight months. Some of them put pressure on the company to be more 
flexible, stating - “Damn your values. We want to move in”xi. These stakeholders, while 
benefiting from the lower uncertainty resulting from Alacrity’s strong commitment to 
ethical values, clearly felt that an eight month delay was too big a price to pay for 
supporting these values. Similarly, there were many customers, employees and suppliers 
who supported Econet after it received the license and started operating its network and 
these pragmatic stakeholders are coded “quid pro quo” in column 5 of Tables 4 and 5. 
Third, the literature suggests that there exist absent stakeholders, who choose not to 
participate in markets, particularly for high stakes transactions such as property 
purchases, due to the high uncertainty they would be exposed to. This leads to the 
market not being as large as it could be. Thus, the institutionalization of ethical behavior 
can significantly expand the market by facilitating transactions that would otherwise not 
have taken place (see Klitgaard, 1991). Klitgaard (1991) studied a number of markets in 
developing countries, such as the milk markets in Pakistan and India, and agricultural 
markets in Bolivia and noted – “It is safe to conclude, however, that a market with 
asymmetric information about quality will have lower levels of both quality and 
quantity than are socially optimal” (p. 45). An organization committing to ethical 
behavior in corrupt environments can send a signal of quality to stakeholders, which if 
credible, will go a long way towards addressing the uncertainty arising from the 
asymmetry of information. Finally, there exist ethical stakeholders, who decide to 
support the ethical organization even though this entails a cost for them, at least in the 
short term, as we clearly show from our data in the Econet and Alacrity cases.  
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Organizations seeking to build ethical reputations in corrupt environments need to 
rally the pragmatic, absent and ethical stakeholders to their cause. This is important 
theoretically because it implies that the specific stakeholder categories that we have 
identified have greater salience than traditional stakeholder boundaries when 
understanding how individuals, groups and organizations respond to attempts to build 
ethical reputation (see McVea and Freeman, 2005, for a detailed discussion on the need 
for a granular understanding of stakeholders, beyond the superficial grouping based on 
roles). Stakeholder groups are not homogeneous in terms of sharing the same values 
with organizations just because they hold a similar relationship to them (e.g. as 
investors, customers or employees). Instead, what is more significant is the degree of 
importance that the different stakeholders place on building ethical reputation, which 
may have little bearing on their stakeholder grouping, but will nevertheless impact how 
they respond to ethical behavior in corrupt environments. 
The key challenge for an ethical organization is to connect with the last three 
categories of stakeholders, and in particular to those that are beyond the strong tie 
networks of the organization to weak tie networks that can broaden the prominence and 
appeal of that organization. This would enable the firm to build the generalized 
networks as opposed to the purely localized ones (Petkova et al, 2008) and facilitate 
growth. The more distant the stakeholders are in terms of network connections, the 
costlier it is to communicate with them and to persuade them to provide their support. 
By showing a commitment to being ethical in an environment where such commitment 
is conspicuous by its absence, an organization initiates the process towards becoming 
known for something (Lange et al, 2011) outside its immediate sphere of influence 
(Petkova et al, 2008). Over time, this being known for something can translate into just 
being known, if the ethical behavior that the organization is known for fades away in 
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the eyes of its stakeholders but it continues to be salient for historical reasons, or into 
generalized favorability, if the organization becomes good at things other than just 
ethical behavior (Lange et al, 2011). This initial step of showing a commitment to 
ethical behavior is necessary but not sufficient to connect to and rally the support of a 
wider group of like-minded stakeholders.  
Two further conditions need to be met to build ethical reputation among key actors 
beyond strong tie networks. First, there is a need for the organization to frame its ethical 
commitment in ways that resonate with a large enough group of stakeholders. Econet 
was able to do this successfully by framing its ethical behavior as emanating from its 
deep commitment to Christian values. In contrast, Alacrity was unable to do so to the 
same extent because of its unwillingness to engage with groups such as local business 
associations. As a last ditch effort, it advertised itself in major national newspapers at 
considerable expense to itself, but this was perceived as an attempt at impression 
management (Carter and Dukerich, 1998; Rindova and Fombrun, 1999), and was 
undermined by opinion leaders such as financial analysts because it was what Rhee and 
Kim (2012) refer to as a ‘superficial response’. Indeed, even the officials in the 
government departments that were praised by Alacrity for having supported its value-
driven mission without expecting bribes expressed their displeasure to the company. In 
their eyes, the advertisements implied that they were honest only with Alacrity and 
dishonest with the other builders. The theoretical implication is that organizations are 
better able to build ethical reputations when they engage with strong and weak ties who 
are committed to supporting ethical behavior even if they personally endure an initial 
cost. 
Second, third-party endorsers such as the media need to reify the ethical message 
to a broader group of stakeholders. This is based on the premise that reputation claims 
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are more credible when they are made by third parties (Dawkins, 2005) or legitimized in 
a credible way (Harvey et al., 2016). According to media system dependency theory 
(Ball-Rokeach and Fleur, 1976), organizations rely on the media to communicate 
information about themselves to their stakeholders. At the same time, the media relies 
on organizations for content that they believe their readers will find interesting 
(Einwiller and Carroll, 2010). Previous studies (for example, Einwiller and Carroll, 
2010) have found that media effects on corporate reputations are not uniform. This is 
because different stakeholders have different needs for information about a firm’s 
attributes (Helm, 2005). Further, stakeholders’ dependence on the media for information 
is greater for those attributes of the firm that are difficult to observe (Demers, Craff, 
Choi and Pessin, 1989). Finally, our findings also show that there are contextual 
conditions that make certain kinds of resistance to corruption more newsworthy than 
others. This newsworthiness allows an organization to connect more easily to like-
minded stakeholders from a wide range of contexts to support its ethical stance, which 
in turn further helps its cause to build an ethical reputation. 
In summary, we propose that the relationship between ethical behaviors and the 
speed and extent of ethical reputation building is mediated by stakeholder responses (in 
particular, representing both strong and weak ties), which are moderated by firm-level 
and contextual variables, such as the high status affiliations, industry characteristics, the 
nature of corruption resisted, the polarity of media and society, and the potential for 
collective action and the presence of an independent judiciary (see Figure 1 for a 
representation of our theoretical framework). 
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….. 
Figure 1 about here 
….. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our research has made a number of contributions to the rich literature that has 
emerged in recent times on organizational reputation. To our knowledge, ours is one of 
the few studies to take the perspective of private sector organizations in the fight against 
corruption in emerging economies. We study the building of one particular type of 
organizational reputation, ethical reputation, in one particular setting, environments in 
which corruption is widespread.  
We show first that it is possible to build and sustain an ethical reputation in corrupt 
environments. The two cases we discuss in this paper provide extensive empirical 
support that ethical reputations can be built by resisting corrupt practices (in this case, 
bribery). Second, we show that for a firm’s ethical behavior to translate into ethical 
reputation, it is crucial for it to elicit favorable responses from like-minded 
stakeholders, which we argue play a central mediating role. The strength of stakeholder 
responses is moderated by firm level and contextual factors. Third, we show that these 
mediator and moderators also shape in important ways the pattern of commitments 
stakeholders make to the focal firm.  
Our study also has limitations, one of which is its limited generalizability due to 
the study of only two extreme cases. Ideally, we would also have liked to study a larger 
number of ethical organizations in corrupt environments as well as those that resisted 
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corruption but did not survive, but we could not do so because of the difficulty of 
identifying such organizations and subsequently gaining access to them. A second 
limitation is the fact that we have analyzed one firm each in two different industries. On 
the one hand, having subject organizations from different industries allowed us to 
theorize about how ethical behavior may be viewed by stakeholders in two very 
different product-markets. On the other hand, it gave us only single cases per industry to 
work with. Once again, we see no easy solutions to the problems involved in identifying 
organizations similar to Econet and Alacrity and then obtaining unfettered access to 
their internal and external stakeholders. We believe that complementing such in-depth 
studies with carefully designed experiments might be a fruitful approach to solving the 
problem of generalizability and advancing our knowledge in this important area. 
We hope that this research will catalyze others to collect more data and provide 
further theoretical and practical insights into organizations building and sustaining 
ethical reputations in corrupt environments. 
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Table 1 – Main characteristics of two firms researched 
Company name Econet Wireless Alacrity Housing* 
Location Harare, Zimbabwe Chennai, India 
Founder Strive Masiyiwa Amol Karnad** 
Date founded August 1994 July 1978 
Period researched 1993-2002 1978-2002 
Industry Telecommunications Residential construction 
Revenues (fiscal 2002) Zimbabwean $ 6.08 billion Indian rupees 260 million 
Number of employees 2002 Approximately 450 197 
Country corruption rank  in 
2002*** 
71 71 
Country corruption 
perception score 
2.7 2.7 
 
 
*  Alacrity Housing was called Alacrity Consultants when it was founded. 
** There were two other founders of the company. Amol Karnad was considered the leader of the 
team. 
*** Both Zimbabwe and India were ranked 71st out of 102 countries, with perception scores of 2.7 in 
the 2002 Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International.  
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Table 2 – Interview information for Alacrity Housing and Econet Wireless 
Stakeholder Alacrity Econet 
Founder 1 1 
Employees 18 18  
Former employees 5 * 2  
Board Members (former or current) 2 * 3 ** 
Customers 4 2  
Suppliers 2  4  
Government / regulatory officials 4  1  
Retired governmental officials 2  - 
Industry experts  2  1  
Former community member 1  - 
Press  2  
Transparency International official  1  
Financial analyst  1  
Former lawyers  3 ** 
Former banker  1  
Founder’s wife  1  
Founder’s pastor  1  
Zimbabwean graduate students  2 *** 
Total 40 42 
 
*  One former employee of Alacrity who was interviewed was also a member of the Board and has 
been included in both categories. The total of the Alacrity interviewees is one less than the sum 
of the column. 
** One former lawyer of Econet was also a Board Member, and another former lawyer was also an 
employee. Each of them has been included in two categories. The total of the Econet 
interviewees is two less than the sum of the column. 
*** One of the students, based in the US, had done research on Econet. The other student, based in 
Norway, had written his Master’s thesis on the liberalization of the media and 
telecommunications in Zimbabwe. 
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Table 3 – Coding categories 
1. Type of stakeholder 
a. Customer 
b. Employee, manager or co-founder 
c. Investor 
d. Supplier of finance 
i. Bank 
ii. Supplier 
e. Supplier (of land, equipment, technology, raw material) 
f. Court 
g. Media (newspapers, magazines) 
h. Community 
i. Government official 
 
 
 
2. Strength of ties with stakeholders 
a. Strong ties (known to entrepreneurs – Strive Masiyiwa or Amol Karnad – before 
resource transfer) 
b. Moderate ties (known to entrepreneurs through somebody else) 
c. Weak ties (not part of entrepreneurs’ 1st or 2nd order network) 
 
3. Types of resource transferred (for each chunk, in some cases more than one type of resource can 
be transferred) 
a. Custom (business, by customers) 
b. Expertise (by employee, manager, or co-founder) 
c. Equity capital 
d. Debt (by bank or supplier) 
e. Land, equipment, technology or raw material (by supplier) 
f. Judgments in favor (by court) 
g. Publicity (by media or analysts) 
h. Emotional support (by community) 
i. Permission to do business (licenses, approvals etc.) by government officials 
 
4. Reasons for resource transfer (multiple reasons can be given) 
a. Personal relationship 
b. Shared values 
c. Quid pro quo (getting something in return for resource transferred) 
d. Justice (or merits of the case) 
 
5. Stage of resource transfer 
a. Pre-operational (Alacrity Housing, before 1981; Econet, before 1998, when the license 
was given) 
b. Post-operational (Alacrity Housing, after 1981; Econet, after 1998)
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Table 4 – Examples of coding: Econet 
Chunk Stakeholder 
group 
Network 
ties 
Type of 
resource 
transferred 
Reasons for 
resource 
transfer 
Stage of resource 
transfer 
CEO of Econet Wireless Zimbabwe: “I know a lot of people who basically said to us: We will not take lines 
from existing operators, we will wait for Econet, no matter how long it takes. … I remember the first day we 
actually got over 30,000 people, just wanting to be activated and connected…” 
Customers Weak ties Custom Shared values Pre-operational 
New York based lawyer, expert in telecommunications law. Strive Masiyiwa explained how he contacted 
her: “I said what I really need is a specialist, and I knew that only Americans are that specialized. So I got in 
touch with a friend of mine who worked for the American Embassy, USAID, and I said to him I was looking 
for some assistance to find an American lawyer who is a telecom specialist. He says: There's only one who 
is mad about Africa, totally excited, if anyone can do it she can. He said: But she's expensive, but let me get 
hold of her. … she's based in New York. So I got hold of (name withheld) and I talked to her on the 'phone, 
and her immediate response was: Look, Strive, I've looked at all the African Telecom laws, I know most of 
them like the back of my hand. That monopoly is watertight, you can't build a mobile. I said: I have gone 
through it, and I think there is something there. She said: Okay, send me a cheque for $20,000 deposit, and 
I'll look at it.” 
Supplier Moderate 
ties 
Expertise 
(legal) 
Quid pro quo Pre-operational 
Former CFO of Econet Wireless: And in that we found ourselves going along, the church was praying for 
us, the Christian community, countrywide. Each time we're thrown out of court the Christians will say: We 
are setting some time to pray and fast. This is too much. You know, the whole nation was praying for us, so 
it was difficult for anybody out there to say I want to fix these guys. Well, they just felt sympathy. There 
was so much support that was poured out from the nation as a result of that, because they felt, no, no, no, it 
appeared like a major injustice to this little Masiyiwa boy. 
Community Weak ties Emotional 
Support 
Shared values Pre-operational 
General Manager in Sales and Marketing of Econet Wireless, joined in May 1999: “Z was the Marketing 
Director at that time, and Z knew me from his days with Lintas, … the integrity and the charisma of the 
leadership in Econet, particularly Strive himself, is what attracted me to Econet. …I felt that I was going to 
make a contribution to Zimbabwe … show the world that Zimbabweans themselves are capable of creating 
and managing an entity in an honest and professional way.” 
Employee Moderate 
ties 
Expertise Shared values, 
Quid pro quo 
Post-operational 
Lawyer, formerly of law firm that advised Econet, joined as an employee in July 1998: “there was a great 
sense of feeling amongst the team that this was principle case, it was a case for justice, it was case against 
corruption…” 
Lawyers Weak ties Expertise Shared values, 
Justice 
Pre-operational 
Finance Director 1995-2000, joined to help with fundraising: “I'd known Strive many years before …. So 
when I came back (from Kenya) he asked me to assist him in putting together the financial funding for the 
company. … I wanted to set up a financial services institution. He said: Help me a little bit and then after 
that you can go and proceed.”  
Strive Masiyiwa: “Him (founder of financial services company) and I are both Christians, as is (Finance 
Director), and a lot of our conviction about how to run a business properly was debated between the three of 
us …” 
Employee Strong ties Expertise Personal 
relationship, 
Shared values  
Pre-operational 
CFO of Econet Wireless joined in February 2001: “It was incredible that the Stock Exchange allowed it to 
go for an IPO. … There was huge and massive support. I guess what drew people to Econet at that time was 
the battle, it went to get its license as an operator.” 
Investors Weak ties Equity capital Shared values Pre-operational 
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Table 5 – Examples of coding: Alacrity 
Chunk Stakeholder 
group 
Network 
distance 
Type of 
resource 
transferred 
Reasons for 
resource 
transfer 
Stage of resource 
transfer – pre or 
post-operational 
Co-founder and later CEO of Alacrity: “…myself and Amol were the two people who started this business, 
it was not to prove to the world, listen there is something called value-based management, something that 
we will demonstrate to the human kind that we are different.  It was not our intention of starting the business 
at all. We started it (Alacrity) because we were not very happy with the manner in which we were being 
treated in our past employment, we believed there was something called human dignity, which for ourselves 
we could experience it in a new business of our own.” 
Employee Strong ties Expertise Personal 
Relationship, 
Shared values, 
Quid pro quo 
Post-operational 
Customer: “I said I do not want a damn thing in black (money), I do not like this comment of black and… I 
just want it all clean, all above board, no issues.” 
Customer Weak ties Custom Shared values, 
Quid pro quo 
Post-operational 
Amol Karnad’s uncle, who handed over ancestral property for development: “It appeared very attractive to 
me simply because he is a person whom I knew, had an inner strength, which was there, and an integrity, 
and therefore you could trust. … I wanted a clean transaction.” 
Supplier Strong ties Land Personal 
relationship, 
Shared values, 
Quid pro quo 
Pre-operational 
Cofounder of Alacrity: “I came to know him at that time. We were very good friends even at that time. In 
fact the friendship was so good that I used to go every evening after my office, I used to meet him. … We 
used to go there, sit and chat. …Then the idea slowly developed that he would like to do business on his 
own. … I was technically one of the founders of Alacrity, it was Memorandum of Association… That way 
he was very different.  He was very intelligent.  He was a person, who even at that time he did have strong 
ideas about right and wrong.” 
Employee Strong ties Expertise Personal 
relationship, 
Shared values 
Pre-operational 
Amol Karnad: “We had a capital of 35,000 rupees. Seven contributions of five thousand. Seven individuals -
- myself, Anil (Amol’s brother), Venkat, Ramakrishna, my father, my uncle, and Ulhas (cousin’s husband).” 
Investors, 
Employees 
Strong ties Equity Capital Personal 
relationship, 
shared values 
Pre-operational 
General Manager of Government Relations Dept: “so I found it very difficult to work with him (previous 
employer). At that time I contacted (co-founder of Alacrity) and told him that his is the problem I am facing 
and if they have any vacancy, I can join. So in January 1989 I joined Alacrity.” 
Employee Moderate 
ties 
Expertise Quid pro quo Post-operational 
Amol Karnad: “and then I got an (consultancy) assignment with the Karnataka Fisheries Corporation. 
Another uncle of mine, …, had retired from there as Director and they had some outstanding problems they 
had not been able to come to terms with, so he asked me whether I would get in …” 
Customers Strong ties Custom Quid pro quo, 
Personal 
relationship 
Pre-operational 
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Figure 1 – Ethical Reputation Building  
 
                                                 
i The Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 2000: “How one entrepreneur beat corruption”.   
ii The Economic Times, December 20, 1992: “An upright builder needs honest clients to be successful”. 
iii Business India, August 5-18, 1991: “Alacrity Group: Concrete Foundation” 
iv Newsweek, July 29, 1996: “Wrong number - Paying the penalty for challenging the state” 
v See endnote ii) 
vi Investment Week, November 16-22, 1992. 
vii V. S. Fernando, The Times of India, November 23, 1992. 
viii Mudar Pathreya, The Economic Times, November 29, 1992. 
ix Capital Market, December 6, 1992. 
x Freedom House: Freedom of the Press Report, 2003. 
xi See endnote ii) 
